Historians seem to expend a lot of time and energy arguing back and forth over many years on the balance of gains and losses in a war. The arguments tend to be plagued by uncertainties over data and definitions from beginning to end. History takes its own time to unfold, so it may not be until some time after the event that the results really start to become clear. Identifying a winner means defining what winning means. But the victor in the war may pay such a high price that they follow up by losing the ensuing peace. Not for nothing has the term Pyrrhic victory entered the lexicon, meaning a victory achieved at excessive cost – winning the battle but losing the war. It happens all too often and is one of many reasons why war should not be taken lightly. 

With such reservations in mind, this post is the third in a series aiming at an initial assessment of gains and losses in the Gulf war, looking at governments that were involved yet wholly or largely non-combatant.

The Gulf region is clearly worse off because of the war – worse off in every sense: human, financial, environmental, psychological, political. They have the resources to recover but their future may look different in significant ways. Tourism will be negatively affected, including the high-end luxury version in which some of the Gulf states specialise. And the war is likely to encourage more governments round the world to diversify energy sources and supply as much as they can, even hastening the green energy transition, thus affecting oil income for the Gulf.

The mediators – in this case, Pakistan playing the leading role with support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey – have a tough task. Mediators always do but the combination of Trump’s fecklessness, Netanyahu’s sidelined carping, and Iran’s intransigence makes their task in this war particularly difficult. The government of Pakistan, however, seems to think differently. It is openly excited – “one of the shining hours in our history”, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has said. This is despite the confusion over the ceasefire agreed on 8 April after talks brokered by Pakistan, when Netanyahu denied that it included Israel’s operations in Lebanon, contrary to Sharif’s clearly stated view of the agreement.

One thing that is clear is that the government of Pakistan was well advised to link up with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to form a mediation team. If Pakistan had gone solo, as it first seemed to be intending, it was more than 90 per cent likely that it would have been hung out to dry, just as Oman and Qatar were when Trump broke off the negotiations in February and proceeded to attack Iran. Nonetheless, Pakistan and the other three governments deserve and are receiving credit for their efforts. That will probably endure even if there is in the end no peace deal, as long as they do not make serious errors in the process.

Russia has got some significant gains because, attempting to deal with increasing global oil prices, Trump eased sanctions on Russia and also put pressure on Ukraine’s President Zelensky to stop attacking Russia’s oil industry, which is a major plank of Ukraine’s current war strategy. The gains are not as great as some early assessments suggested largely because of the scale of the problems the Russian government is facing, including lack of progress on the battlefield, army recruitment problems, and a growing budget deficit. In addition, Russia’s support for Iran – inevitable given Iranian support for Russia over Ukraine – means a diplomatic alienation from the Gulf state, which in turn is likely to lead to much less investment capital coming from the Gulf. Some gains, then, but some losses too.

Ukraine has also benefitted, with President Zelensky’s quick visit to Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE producing deals for sales of Ukrainian equipment and the provision of technical assistance in repelling Iran’s drones. As Zelensky provides the practical support the Gulf states need to protect themselves from the consequences of American actions, we watch his and Ukraine’s stature growing while US stature diminishes. There are clear signs that Zelensky recognises this and is taking a very different approach to relations with Trump and the US than he felt forced to on his first visit to Trump’s White House in February 2025.

China looks like a beneficiary of the war, having hedged effectively against a reduction of oil and other imports from the Gulf. Part of its gain is simply the other side of the coin of a diminished America. But as the world’s major exporter, China will also face difficulties if there is a global economic recession. It is also unlikely to be happy with the disorder created as US policy flails about. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that it favours a quick negotiated end to the war. 

However, China has little leverage or openings to press any of three main players to make any concessions to get an agreement. The prestige, influence and political advantage it accrued in the region from brokering improved relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia three years ago have dissipated and dwindled. Its characteristically careful responses to the war and refusal to condemn one or support the other in clear language helps it keep its options open but is not winning it friends. And its argument for a negotiated settlement has to contend with some uncomfortable truths, as do all who want a diplomatic solution: the two sides’ positions are far apart, Iran is intransigent, Israel still seems to be spoiling for a fight, and the USA broke off negotiations to attack Iran in February, which does not encourage Iranian confidence in the negotiating process.

European and other allies face their own version of the problem of a lack of leverage to achieve their desired outcome, which is, put bluntly, a return to the difficult normality that prevailed before the end of February. Over 40 governments led by France and the UK have agreed to put together a naval force to support freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz once a full ceasefire has been agreed. Like any peacekeeping force or ceasefire monitoring mission, it risks getting caught in the crossfire if violence flares again but that could be a risk worth taking. If successful, the economic gains would be clear and the political gains at least equally significant, not least because the coordination to achieve it would be impressive (it already is in several ways) and could be a sign of things to come. That said, the force would only come into being after an agreement, which these 40-plus governments have no means of bringing about. There are potential gains, then, but until now, the main gain is demonstrating a capacity for coordination and for autonomy from the US.

Summing up (after 3 posts)

As well causing the deaths of 6,000 to 8,6000 people, the war has had, is having and will continue to have a negative impact on the prosperity of ordinary people all round the world. Reports of the impact in both Africa and Asia are deeply concerning as shortages and privation risk stoking social tensions and potential conflicts. And as I outlined in the first of these three posts, the impacts on nature, legality and human rights are also negative and serious.  

There is not enough to enter on the positive side to balance out the negatives.

Among the three main combatants, there is no clear winner. 

• Israel has gained some short-term advantage by being able to get away with military action in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria as well as on the West Bank, with less scrutiny than it would otherwise have faced. In the longer term it is likely to pay a significant price in damaged friendships for precisely those actions.
• Iran has achieved something simply by not losing. The regime has not changed but has hardened and has a tighter grip. It is weakened militarily, despite having asserted control of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as economically. Its strategy of spreading the pain will make post war regional relationships more difficult and likely deepen its isolation. 
• The US is significantly weakened by the illegal war it launched, using up military assets at a phenomenal rate without, as yet, decisively degrading Iran missile forces or getting close to forcing Iran to surrender its enriched uranium. It has lost moral capital, reputation and capacity for strategic leadership.

Among the others:

• The Gulf region is worse off, regional security is diminished, global prosperity is at risk, food insecurity is on the rise. 
• The mediators are in credit and will continue to be, even if there is no agreement, as long as they themselves do not blunder.
• Russia has benefitted but, compared to the scale of problems caused for it by its war on Ukraine, the gain is marginal.
• Ukraine has benefitted because the Gulf states want its drone technology.
• China faces economic costs but is benefitting politically as the US declines.
• European and other allies of the US face serious economic costs but also have the opportunity – if they finally see the need – to increase their autonomy from the US. 

It is, however, possible, as I mentioned in an earlier post, that the war’s impact on energy supplies and costs will be the basis of a learning moment, with governments and citizens recognising that basing energy strategy on imported fossil fuels is a recipe for national vulnerability as well as ecological disruption. Increased investment in renewable energy – windmills, solar panels, tidal, wave and geothermal power – would mitigate environmental and geopolitical risk in a single package. That would neither justify nor compensate for the damage the war is causing but it would be something worthwhile to rescue from the wreckage.