War in the Gulf: provisional balance sheet, part 3

Historians seem to expend a lot of time and energy arguing back and forth over many years on the balance of gains and losses in a war. The arguments tend to be plagued by uncertainties over data and definitions from beginning to end. History takes its own time to unfold, so it may not be until some time after the event that the results really start to become clear. Identifying a winner means defining what winning means. But the victor in the war may pay such a high price that they follow up by losing the ensuing peace. Not for nothing has the term Pyrrhic victory entered the lexicon, meaning a victory achieved at excessive cost – winning the battle but losing the war. It happens all too often and is one of many reasons why war should not be taken lightly. 

With such reservations in mind, this post is the third in a series aiming at an initial assessment of gains and losses in the Gulf war, looking at governments that were involved yet wholly or largely non-combatant.

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War in the Gulf: provisional balance sheet, part 2

The question is whether any government has benefitted from the Gulf War that began on 28 February when Israel and the USA attacked Iran. How do the costs and benefits stack up politically? Whose national interests have been enhanced by the war so far?

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The war on Iran: signals emerging from the noise

Through the nonsensical miasma of illogical, ahistorical, untrue and self-contradictory utterances by the American president and his administration about their war on Iran, each one more ridiculous than the last, a few things are starting to stand out with some degree of clarity. They are pointers of a kind to today, tomorrow and after that. This post and the next couple take a look at a few of them. This one focuses on the US build-up, the search for a way out, and the Strait of Hormuz. It’s not comprehensive in any way, just what I can figure out at the moment.

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Evaluating President Trump’s Gaza peace plan

The fate of the peace plan for Gaza announced at the White House on Monday 29 September is not yet decided. Because Hamas accepted the hostage return part of the proposed deal, while seeking negotiation of other parts, US President Trump ordered Israel to stop bombing. It did not immediately do that though the Prime Minister’s office said it was preparing for “immediate implementation” of the first stage of the plan.

There has, of course, been considerable coverage of the plan in the news media. Some focusses on its prospects, including the impact of divisions within Hamas about it, along with the matter of whether Trump will impose a deadline for Hamas’ acceptance and how long it might be. There has been some coverage of gaps and uncertainties in the plan and plenty of advocates have been out there to disparage or support the plan. And there’s been quite some discussion about whether President Trump prevailed over Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in crafting the plan, or the other way round.

But, so far as I have seen, there has been little dispassionate coverage of whether it is actually a good plan, whether it will work. So this post is my clause-by-clause assessment of the Gaza peace plan.

Peace is a tricky business. An 1100 word document containing 20 points is not a treaty, is not legally binding, and is bound to contain a number of generalities and broad statements of intent. That leaves plenty of room for uncertainty to creep in. Nonetheless, it is a serious document and not the first one to address how to end the war in Gaza. It builds on the never-implemented January 2025 agreement, which itself built on the never-implemented May 2024 agreement. With those foundations, there ought to be some key issues on which there is clarity but there should also be some latitude for uncertainty, interpretation and further discussion.

In sum, not surprisingly, what comes out is mixed – some strengths, some weakness, some areas of clarity and some confusion.

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World order §5a: Laws and norms – and the ICJ speaks on Israel

The International Court of Justice – the highest legal body in the UN system – has issued an advisory opinion (i.e., a legal ruling) about Israeli settlements on the West Bank.

The 80-page judgement refers seven times to “Israel’s unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, explains why and how it is unlawful. Israel’s presence, the court makes clear, violates “the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force and the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people” (paragraph 267). Since the presence is against international law, “Israel has an obligation to put an end to those unlawful acts” (paragraph 268). Further, “Israel is also under an obligation to provide full reparation for the damage caused by its internationally wrongful acts to all natural or legal persons concerned” (paragraph 269).

This is not the first time the ICJ has declared against Israel’s occupation of the West Bank; it did so 20 years ago. What I found striking, since I am thinking a lot and writing about the shaky condition of world order today, is that the ICJ is also clear about other states’ obligations:

“In view of the character and importance of the rights and obligations involved, all States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. They are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by Israel’s illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.” (paragraph 279)

It feels like another acid test for much of the West about right and wrong, law and norms. Is is too much to hope for consistency?

World order §4: Conflict management in a disordered world: the Security Council and Gaza

During the 2020s, on current trends, four times as many people (or more) will die in war as in the first decade of this century. Since 2010, the number of armed conflicts each year has almost doubled. The number of refugees has more than doubled in the same period. Meanwhile the world spends vastly more on the military than ever before, 2.443 trillion US dollars in 2023, compared to about 1.1 trillion at the start of the century.

What is going on? What has happened – is happening – to the world and to conflict? How come conflict management doesn’t seem to be working any more?

This post is number 4 in a series, based on the introductory chapter to the recently released SIPRI Yearbook 2024, asking, What world are we shaping for ourselves in the coming decades if these trends continue unchanged? 

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The Trump administration on Israel and Palestine: is it a new peace plan?

We live in troubled and troubling times. Though we can, if we look, find reasons for optimism, many indicators are pointing in the wrong direction – more armed conflicts, more military spending, more arms trading. Worse, this unfolds against a seriously concerning background of long-term trends: increasingly toxic geopolitics, the crumbling of arms control and the climate crisis. The doomsday clock of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has moved 20 seconds closer to midnight; it has never been closer.

Amid the gloom, would it not be a welcome relief for a new peace vision for the Middle East to be launched, to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict, and open the door to a new possibility of political and social progress in the region?

Yes it would. But…

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The US withdrawal from the Iran deal: one year on

On 8 May last year, US President Trump announced that the United States would pull out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which sets limits on Iran’s nuclear programme to ensure that it cannot produce nuclear weapons. Despite the US withdrawal, the JCPOA remains in force. Today, however, Iranian state TV reported that, while remaining in the JCPOA, Iran is planning to resume some nuclear activities that were ceased under the agreement. Continue reading

And 2019: what could/should happen next?

2018 was another year of uncertainty and a spreading feeling of insecurity. What could turn that round in 2019? Here are some thoughts:

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Sackings, summits and somersaults in US foreign policy

It’s not quite “All change!” at the top of US foreign policy but not very far from it. Three key positions have changed in the last two weeks: Rex Tillerson out at the State Department, with Mike Pompeo coming from the CIA, where his Deputy Gina Haspel replaces him, and HR McMaster is out as National Security Advisor, replaced by John Bolton. So, er, what’s going on?  Continue reading