War in the Gulf: provisional balance sheet, part 3

Historians seem to expend a lot of time and energy arguing back and forth over many years on the balance of gains and losses in a war. The arguments tend to be plagued by uncertainties over data and definitions from beginning to end. History takes its own time to unfold, so it may not be until some time after the event that the results really start to become clear. Identifying a winner means defining what winning means. But the victor in the war may pay such a high price that they follow up by losing the ensuing peace. Not for nothing has the term Pyrrhic victory entered the lexicon, meaning a victory achieved at excessive cost – winning the battle but losing the war. It happens all too often and is one of many reasons why war should not be taken lightly. 

With such reservations in mind, this post is the third in a series aiming at an initial assessment of gains and losses in the Gulf war, looking at governments that were involved yet wholly or largely non-combatant.

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Attack on Iran: unclear motives, unknown outcomes & energy vulnerability

In my previous post about the onslaught on Iran by Israel and the USA, I used the metaphor of a coin toss to say how hard it is to forecast the outcome. I left it to others to work out the motive for the attack, unpicking the incoherent contradictions in what the US President has said, weighing the various statements and retractions others have made. Instead, I pondered the question of regime change. It was once derided as a US goal by Trump but now he has adopted. Or maybe not since some of his recent statements boil down to saying the war is won though it is not over.

Anyway, as to regime change, I saw three possible outcomes: the hoped for democratic transition; an even more repressive state; and civil war. News that the CIA has been getting ready to support a Kurdish insurgency makes it seem that civil war is the likeliest.

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