War in the Gulf: Is it over? What’s the result?

There are reports in several outlets that Iran and the US are getting close to agreement on a memorandum to end the war. The reports are based, so it’s said, on leaks from the Pakistani team that is mediating the Iran-US discussions. So what we are seeing might be an effort by the mediators to move things along a bit. Or it may be a trial balloon at the request of one side or both to gauge reaction not only from the adversary but also, and more importantly, from their respective home fronts. Or we could just be hearing weightless rumours.

Only time will tell. We have heard so much rubbish in the claims and counter-claims from both sides that a bit of caution is justified. But being cautious about doubting the reports as well as believing them, it makes sense to take a closer look.

As I’ve said in earlier posts, ceasefires are complex and reflect the dynamics of war as much as the requirements of peace. The reported contents of the possible joint Iranian-US memo reflect that point. They would mean suspending rather than ending the war, and, thereby, making time available to actually bring the war to an end.

Here’s what the key points are thought to be:

  1. A temporary halt to Iran’s nuclear enrichment, and/or a limitation on the amount of enriched uranium it can hold;
  2. Gradually lifting US sanctions and releasing frozen Iranian funds;
  3. Allowing more shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, leading in time to full freedom of passage;
  4. Agreement to come to a broader and more detailed agreement, allowing 30 days for negotiation.

First of all, this is not a comprehensive settlement but it could be a first step. Having seen many first steps towards peace in several decades of looking at the question, it is clear to me that they are fundamental – they are how every journey starts – but the second and subsequent steps are all crucial too.

That said, let’s take the points in turn.

  1. Halting/limiting enrichment: That’s right, the uranium enrichment that is part of the nuclear programme the US president has often said was ‘obliterated’ in June last year. Also, the uranium enrichment that that was limited by the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, from which the US president withdrew his country in 2018. Reinstating that kind of limitation would be beneficial and is eminently feasible.
  2. Lift US sanctions and return the funds: My Iranian friends are already saying they’ll believe it when they see it. US sanctions on Iran were first imposed in 1979 because of the radical students who seized the US Embassy and held staff hostage with the approval of Iran’s then leader, Ayatollah Khomenei. Sanctions relief was also supposed to follow the 2015 Iran nuclear deal but never came through. Doing it now might seem like a reward to the Iranian regime for holding out despite its decapitation on the first day of this war. But long-term, sanctions relief will probably do more for the people of Iran than anything else can.
  3. Freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz: Yes, like it was before the war.
  4. Agreement to try for a broader agreement: The agreement will probably look a bit like the one that was being negotiated in February until the US president broke it off and started the war. The talks happening then were regarded as getting close to achieving agreement by both the mediators from Oman, and the UK National Security Adviser, who was observing.

It may seem as if a first good look at the main points of what may be an agreement between Iran and the USA confirms the widely held view that this war has achieved nothing. But look again.

Yes, for Israel and the USA who launched the war on 28 February, the war looks pointless – an exercise in foolish arrogance, based on a comprehensive misunderstanding of how power works in Iran, a misreading of the regime’s strategy, and a naive confidence in the effectiveness of force. On uranium enrichment, on freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and on willingness to negotiate, Israel and the USA have achieved the status quo ante with gut-wrenching human tragedy and massive environmental pollution along the way back to the starting point. And on regime change, for all the silliness of remarks that if the leader has changed then the regime has changed, actually everybody knows that nothing has been achieved.

But for the Iranian leadership, if sanctions that have been in place for almost half a century are lifted and they do get access to frozen funds, then that is not simply a return to the status quo ante. That is a distinct gain, a new and better situation. It would be, for want of a better word, a win.

And the fact that it is such a clear advantage for Iran’s leaders coming out of this war is a large part of the explanation for my scepticism that this is really the end, or even the beginning of the end as somebody once said, even if the reports are completely accurate.

War on Iran: on-again, off-again?

There are three current ceasefires in the Middle East. 

  • One is between Israel and the USA on one side and Iran on the other; each side accuses the other of violating it. 
  • One is between Israel and Lebanon. This is odd because Israel was not fighting the government of Lebanon but the forces of Hezbollah. It began by opposing talks between the two governments but has said it will respect the ceasefire as long as it is not one-sided. Israel has accused Hezbollah of violating the ceasefire and the Lebanese army has reported Israeli violations. The ceasefire expires on 26 April.
  • And the third is in Gaza where, six months after it was first signed, Israeli attacks continue, killing at least 32 Palestinians in April (in a total of at least 738 since the ceasefire was declared on 10 October 2025).

In short, the ceasefire in the war of Israel and the USA against Iran is not unique in its complexity and uncertainty. Ceasefires are almost always tricky and routinely fragile, reflecting the dynamics of war as much as the possibilities of peace. This one has proven to be no exception to the rule. Within half a day, the parties and mediators were disputing what was agreed, whether the ceasefire was supposed to include Lebanon, what would happen with Iran’s enriched uranium, and what would happen with the Strait of Hormuz. 

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Attack on Iran: unclear motives, unknown outcomes & energy vulnerability

In my previous post about the onslaught on Iran by Israel and the USA, I used the metaphor of a coin toss to say how hard it is to forecast the outcome. I left it to others to work out the motive for the attack, unpicking the incoherent contradictions in what the US President has said, weighing the various statements and retractions others have made. Instead, I pondered the question of regime change. It was once derided as a US goal by Trump but now he has adopted. Or maybe not since some of his recent statements boil down to saying the war is won though it is not over.

Anyway, as to regime change, I saw three possible outcomes: the hoped for democratic transition; an even more repressive state; and civil war. News that the CIA has been getting ready to support a Kurdish insurgency makes it seem that civil war is the likeliest.

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Attack on Iran: Israel and the USA have flipped the coin – where and how will it land?

When the USSR invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, assassinated President Hafizullah Amin and installed a more compliant government, it kicked off an era of war and terror that has not ended 47 years later. When the USA and allies invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003, it initiated a period of war and terror that may now be coming to an end with a degree of political stability and less violence in the last two years. When France and the UK with seemingly reluctant support from the USA intervened in Libya in 2011, weakening the rule of Muammar Gaddafi so insurgents found and killed him, it opened a period of war and chaos that has produced a fragile balance between two competing governments and intermittent violent conflict between them.  

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The Gaza peace plan, 2 weeks in: continuing assessment

On 8 October, two years and one day after Hamas’s savage incursion into Israel that triggered Israel’s hyper-destructive onslaught on Gaza, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio passed a note to President Trump in the middle of a press conference, then whispered to him to say he could announce that a ceasefire had been agreed.

So began the implementation of the 20-point Gaza peace plan that Trump had announced at the White House on 29 September. Discussion followed between Israel, Hamas and other interested parties – the USA, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and doubtless many others via standard diplomatic channels. On 3 October, after Trump set a 5 October deadline for Hamas to accept the plan or suffer “all hell”, Hamas agreed to release the remaining hostages it had held for two years, including the bodies of the dead, and repeated what it had said before, that Gaza could be run by a technocratic administration as Trump’s peace plan envisaged. As multiple news outlets reported, this was a partial acceptance – a “yes but” rather than full-blown consent. While Trump threatened Hamas with “complete obliteration” if it refused to fit in with his plan, the Israeli bombardment of Gaza continued, and negotiators met in Sharm el-Shaikh, Egypt, to get the peace plan on the road.

Two weeks after Rubio whispered in his President’s ear, how is the plan doing? I gave my view of it before there was any action, aiming to assess it as a plan, in its own terms, asking not whether it was right or wrong, fair or unfair, but would it work? It is what you could call a negotiations perspective, a technical assessment. In the same vein, two weeks in, how does it look now?

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Evaluating President Trump’s Gaza peace plan

The fate of the peace plan for Gaza announced at the White House on Monday 29 September is not yet decided. Because Hamas accepted the hostage return part of the proposed deal, while seeking negotiation of other parts, US President Trump ordered Israel to stop bombing. It did not immediately do that though the Prime Minister’s office said it was preparing for “immediate implementation” of the first stage of the plan.

There has, of course, been considerable coverage of the plan in the news media. Some focusses on its prospects, including the impact of divisions within Hamas about it, along with the matter of whether Trump will impose a deadline for Hamas’ acceptance and how long it might be. There has been some coverage of gaps and uncertainties in the plan and plenty of advocates have been out there to disparage or support the plan. And there’s been quite some discussion about whether President Trump prevailed over Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in crafting the plan, or the other way round.

But, so far as I have seen, there has been little dispassionate coverage of whether it is actually a good plan, whether it will work. So this post is my clause-by-clause assessment of the Gaza peace plan.

Peace is a tricky business. An 1100 word document containing 20 points is not a treaty, is not legally binding, and is bound to contain a number of generalities and broad statements of intent. That leaves plenty of room for uncertainty to creep in. Nonetheless, it is a serious document and not the first one to address how to end the war in Gaza. It builds on the never-implemented January 2025 agreement, which itself built on the never-implemented May 2024 agreement. With those foundations, there ought to be some key issues on which there is clarity but there should also be some latitude for uncertainty, interpretation and further discussion.

In sum, not surprisingly, what comes out is mixed – some strengths, some weakness, some areas of clarity and some confusion.

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Munich insecurities conference 2018

The 2018 edition of the Munich Security Conference (MSC), a top level meeting on peace and security issues, was held on 16-18 February. Among the participants were “more than 30 heads of state and government and over 100 cabinet ministers from across the globe”. There was not much sense of actual security to be found. Continue reading

Iran nuclear deal under pressure

The Iran nuclear deal – formally, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA – is under pressure. In his speech to the UN General Assembly today, 19 September, President Trump called it “one of the worst and most one-sided deals” and said it is “an embarrassment to the United States.” Some commentators already see this as advance notice that the US will pull out of the agreement. But it was a good deal when it was made in 2015, it is being properly implemented, and it should be upheld. Continue reading

Syria – myth and argument about non-intervention

Last week an article in the Washington Post stirred what seemed like quite a Twitter buzz, lamenting the effects of “the disastrous nonintervention in Syria“. The article is angry and vivid about the misery and destruction wrought by war in Syria. It blames the war’s continuation largely on the US deciding not to intervene in the war. It is an argument that could become influential so it’s worth examining. Continue reading

Syria: Geneva III, the nettle of negotiation (again), and ISIS (again)

Two years ago, the Geneva II talks on Syria took place. As they began, their prospects could be optimistically viewed as “virtually zero“. On Friday 29 January, Geneva III talks are due to begin and prospects do not look much better. That doesn’t mean they are a waste of time. Continue reading