Historians seem to expend a lot of time and energy arguing back and forth over many years on the balance of gains and losses in a war. The arguments tend to be plagued by uncertainties over data and definitions from beginning to end. History takes its own time to unfold, so it may not be until some time after the event that the results really start to become clear. Identifying a winner means defining what winning means. But the victor in the war may pay such a high price that they follow up by losing the ensuing peace. Not for nothing has the term Pyrrhic victory entered the lexicon, meaning a victory achieved at excessive cost – winning the battle but losing the war. It happens all too often and is one of many reasons why war should not be taken lightly. 

With such reservations in mind, this post is the third in a series aiming at an initial assessment of gains and losses in the Gulf war, looking at governments that were involved yet wholly or largely non-combatant.