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War in the Gulf: provisional balance sheet, part 3

/ Dan Smith / Leave a comment

Historians seem to expend a lot of time and energy arguing back and forth over many years on the balance of gains and losses in a war. The arguments tend to be plagued by uncertainties over data and definitions from beginning to end. History takes its own time to unfold, so it may not be until some time after the event that the results really start to become clear. Identifying a winner means defining what winning means. But the victor in the war may pay such a high price that they follow up by losing the ensuing peace. Not for nothing has the term Pyrrhic victory entered the lexicon, meaning a victory achieved at excessive cost – winning the battle but losing the war. It happens all too often and is one of many reasons why war should not be taken lightly. 

With such reservations in mind, this post is the third in a series aiming at an initial assessment of gains and losses in the Gulf war, looking at governments that were involved yet wholly or largely non-combatant.

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War in the Gulf: provisional balance sheet, part 2

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The question is whether any government has benefitted from the Gulf War that began on 28 February when Israel and the USA attacked Iran. How do the costs and benefits stack up politically? Whose national interests have been enhanced by the war so far?

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War in the Gulf: a provisional balance sheet

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In the space between peace and war that the Gulf crisis has now entered, and from which it may exit at any point, if only for a brief time, maybe this is a convenient moment to think about what has been gained and what has been lost so far. 

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War in the Gulf: Is it over? What’s the result?

/ Dan Smith / 2 Comments

There are reports in several outlets that Iran and the US are getting close to agreement on a memorandum to end the war. The reports are based, so it’s said, on leaks from the Pakistani team that is mediating the Iran-US discussions. So what we are seeing might be an effort by the mediators to move things along a bit. Or it may be a trial balloon at the request of one side or both to gauge reaction not only from the adversary but also, and more importantly, from their respective home fronts. Or we could just be hearing weightless rumours.

Only time will tell. We have heard so much rubbish in the claims and counter-claims from both sides that a bit of caution is justified. But being cautious about doubting the reports as well as believing them, it makes sense to take a closer look.

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War on Iran: on-again, off-again?

/ Dan Smith / 1 Comment

There are three current ceasefires in the Middle East. 

  • One is between Israel and the USA on one side and Iran on the other; each side accuses the other of violating it. 
  • One is between Israel and Lebanon. This is odd because Israel was not fighting the government of Lebanon but the forces of Hezbollah. It began by opposing talks between the two governments but has said it will respect the ceasefire as long as it is not one-sided. Israel has accused Hezbollah of violating the ceasefire and the Lebanese army has reported Israeli violations. The ceasefire expires on 26 April.
  • And the third is in Gaza where, six months after it was first signed, Israeli attacks continue, killing at least 32 Palestinians in April (in a total of at least 738 since the ceasefire was declared on 10 October 2025).

In short, the ceasefire in the war of Israel and the USA against Iran is not unique in its complexity and uncertainty. Ceasefires are almost always tricky and routinely fragile, reflecting the dynamics of war as much as the possibilities of peace. This one has proven to be no exception to the rule. Within half a day, the parties and mediators were disputing what was agreed, whether the ceasefire was supposed to include Lebanon, what would happen with Iran’s enriched uranium, and what would happen with the Strait of Hormuz. 

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The war on Iran: from the ceasefire to the off-ramp?

/ Dan Smith / 2 Comments

The ceasefire in the US-Israeli war on Iran brings cautious relief. The bombing, the missiles, the destruction and the killing can stop, which is unreservedly good. But ceasefires are tricky things. They reflect the dynamics of war as much as peace and the threats each side holds over the other persist. Israel and the USA can unleash physically destructive forces Iran cannot match. Iran can unleash economically destructive forces to which the USA has no viable response except more destruction.

That Iran’s strategy is viable is clear every time Trump blinks when the oil price jumps or the stock market slumps. And that strategy has given Iran the strategic initiative, which Trump’s threat to erase Iranian civilisation does not take away. 

Big blustery threats and swear words from Trump aside, what can we see unfolding amid the thick fog of this war? This is the second in a series of blog posts sketching out a few pointers I see to what is happening today and what may happen tomorrow and the day after. 

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The war on Iran: signals emerging from the noise

/ Dan Smith / 2 Comments

Through the nonsensical miasma of illogical, ahistorical, untrue and self-contradictory utterances by the American president and his administration about their war on Iran, each one more ridiculous than the last, a few things are starting to stand out with some degree of clarity. They are pointers of a kind to today, tomorrow and after that. This post and the next couple take a look at a few of them. This one focuses on the US build-up, the search for a way out, and the Strait of Hormuz. It’s not comprehensive in any way, just what I can figure out at the moment.

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Attack on Iran: Israel and the USA have flipped the coin – where and how will it land?

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When the USSR invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, assassinated President Hafizullah Amin and installed a more compliant government, it kicked off an era of war and terror that has not ended 47 years later. When the USA and allies invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003, it initiated a period of war and terror that may now be coming to an end with a degree of political stability and less violence in the last two years. When France and the UK with seemingly reluctant support from the USA intervened in Libya in 2011, weakening the rule of Muammar Gaddafi so insurgents found and killed him, it opened a period of war and chaos that has produced a fragile balance between two competing governments and intermittent violent conflict between them.  

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Reflections on Venezuela, Trump and world order

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As the world knows, on 3 January 2026, in an operation involving over 150 aircraft, US Special Forces raided Caracas, seized President Maduro and his wife, and took them to New York to be charged and tried as criminals, and the US President announced that the USA would now run Venezuela for a time. This use of force breached the United Nations Charter and rightly set off alarm bells and alert sirens all round the world. A future seems to loom before us in which the strong do what they can, and the weak do what they must. Why did it happen and what comes next?

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Evaluating President Trump’s Gaza peace plan

/ Dan Smith / 7 Comments

The fate of the peace plan for Gaza announced at the White House on Monday 29 September is not yet decided. Because Hamas accepted the hostage return part of the proposed deal, while seeking negotiation of other parts, US President Trump ordered Israel to stop bombing. It did not immediately do that though the Prime Minister’s office said it was preparing for “immediate implementation” of the first stage of the plan.

There has, of course, been considerable coverage of the plan in the news media. Some focusses on its prospects, including the impact of divisions within Hamas about it, along with the matter of whether Trump will impose a deadline for Hamas’ acceptance and how long it might be. There has been some coverage of gaps and uncertainties in the plan and plenty of advocates have been out there to disparage or support the plan. And there’s been quite some discussion about whether President Trump prevailed over Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in crafting the plan, or the other way round.

But, so far as I have seen, there has been little dispassionate coverage of whether it is actually a good plan, whether it will work. So this post is my clause-by-clause assessment of the Gaza peace plan.

Peace is a tricky business. An 1100 word document containing 20 points is not a treaty, is not legally binding, and is bound to contain a number of generalities and broad statements of intent. That leaves plenty of room for uncertainty to creep in. Nonetheless, it is a serious document and not the first one to address how to end the war in Gaza. It builds on the never-implemented January 2025 agreement, which itself built on the never-implemented May 2024 agreement. With those foundations, there ought to be some key issues on which there is clarity but there should also be some latitude for uncertainty, interpretation and further discussion.

In sum, not surprisingly, what comes out is mixed – some strengths, some weakness, some areas of clarity and some confusion.

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