A quick look at the Shenzhen “peace declaration”

So a peace declaration has to be a good thing, right? Especially when the leaders of the three great powers issue it at a first-of-its-kind summit.

The declaration issued by Presidents Putin, Trump and Xi after their trilateral summit at Shenzhen consists of four substantive paragraphs following a standard introductory paragraph about them having had an in-depth discussion.

The four key paragraphs are, in turn, clichéd, dangerous, tricky and the repetition of an important commitment.

1. As permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, China, Russia, and the United States committed to reform the U.N. so that the U.N. can respond more effectively to global challenges and conform to its fundamental mission of international peace and security.

If they had said what reform they are committed to, it would have been less of a cliché and more of a, you know, statement. Or declaration. There have been decades of intensive debate about UN reform and screeds of reports and proposals. So far, so little progress. This sentence does not visibly move the needle of that discussion.

2. The three countries plan to increase the production and supply of refined petroleum products for the benefit of all nations. They reaffirmed the importance of stable energy flows.

Perfectly timed as the climate summit, COP 31, nears its end in Antalya, Türkiye, here comes a commitment to produce more fossil fuels and thus keep average global temperatures rising. This kind of irresponsibility is no longer surprising – yet it still takes the breath away.

Putin needs this to beat sanctions and fund Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.Trump wants it since slowing supply and rising prices because of his badly thought out war on Iran are part of what explains the US mid-term elections and the losses he and his party suffered.

It could be that Trump thinks Putin will help set up a deal between Iran and the US to get ships moving through the Strait of Hormuz at something like the pre-war rate. But Iran has its own strategic and economic calculus, which may not match either their adversary’s or their ally’s.

3. The three heads of state recognized that the principle of state consent and respect for immunities of State officials are of paramount importance, and concurred that the International Criminal Court and other similar bodies must not abuse their jurisdiction.

On the one hand, this is Trump and Putin taking aim at the ICC, which they each have reasons to dislike – Putin because it issued a warrant to arrest him, and Trump because it issued a warrant to arrest Israel’s Netanyahu.

On the other hand, when they say, “respect for immunities of State officials”, they don’t say much. They don’t say “impunity” for example. And state officials do indeed have diplomatically agreed immunities, well defined by international agreement. Read that way, the statement is vacuous.

Likewise their statement that, “the International Criminal Court and other similar bodies must not abuse their jurisdiction.” With sentiments like this, it’s worth applying the principle of the hypothetical contrary: would anyone agree with the contrary statement that the ICC and other bodies must abuse their jurisdiction? No? In that case the statement that they must not is pointless.

So that’s the tricky paragraph: read one way, it’s three great powers taking aim against international law; read the other way, it’s a pile of nothing.

4. The three heads of state reaffirmed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The three countries will conduct a dialogue on reducing nuclear risks and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This is a worthwhile reaffirmation of the longer statement that these three governments together with France and the UK issued in January 2022, when they also agreed to avoid arms racing and dangerous international behaviour. The dialogue on reducing nuclear risks has been going for over a decade and it is good that these three leaders support it. And, of course, the treaty commitment to preventing nuclear weapons proliferation is 56 years old.

A worthwhile paragraph, in short, but nothing new.

At least it wasn’t Yalta redux

Before the summit, there was a lot of excited discussion about whether the meeting would be a new Yalta: like when Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin met and carved up Europe, would today’s big three carve out their global spheres of influence? It made for some fun reading but was never very likely.

It is, all scepticism and sarcasm to one side, and despite the boost for the fossil fuel industry, a positive that three leaders who still have much that divides them – places and issues where their interests diverge or clash – can sit down together, say some nice things, and issue a bland statement for peace. It has not achieved anything but that’s considerably less bad than it could have been if they had got as far as even talking about spheres of influence in their closing statement.

After the summit, those aspects of world affairs that are worrying remain so. Those sources of hope in people and some governments beginning to address those problems remain hopeful. And on we go, not distracted by Shenzhen.

Designing a new architecture for peace

These days, as I’ve said before, it is difficult to talk about peace and disarmament and imagine what peace could look like.  And it has never been more necessary to do so.

The 2026 annual conference of the Group of 78 on October 9 & 10 offers an opportunity to do so. You can participate online (register here) or in person at the University of Ottawa. Its stated goal is to be part of designing a new architecture for peace in our dangerous world – renewing the institutions, defunding the war machine, assessing the role of AI, connecting with citizens’ movements.

I will be one of three keynote speakers along with Peggy Mason (Rideau Institute) and former Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy.

Ecological security: an important moment

The UN General Assembly high-level week is an uber talkfest, so it’s important to use the opportunity to say something important. While most of the media attention has been on some more rambling boasting from the US President, UK Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband did indeed use the opportunity and used it well.

An intelligence assessment for the UK government on the security impact of ecological disruption was completed not far short of a year ago. It is a report of the Joint Intelligence Committee so it is not a surprise that the government sat on it for several months. What was a surprise is that when it was finally published in January this year, instead of there being a fanfare, it was eased into public view as a report from the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. It was a kind of backhanded way of publishing it, suggesting a grudging acceptance of the need to publish it but no intention to go much further.

The Guardian says that the version that was published was redacted. If so, I shudder to think what may be in the full version. Here is the first sentence of the summary:

“Global ecosystem degradation and collapse threaten UK national security and prosperity.”

So far as I can see on reading it, no punches are pulled. And by the way, the otherwise excellent reportage in The Guardian is wrongly headlined to say the report is about the impact of climate change. The report rightly goes wider than that, as its title as well as its first sentence make clear.

So what did Ed Miliband do? –– He spoke. He shared the substance of the report at a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, speaking to foreign ministers of the EU, Kenya and others. And he finished off with a good, sharp message:

“The countries fit for the future will be those that see climate and nature as intrinsic to economic and national security. 

“Countries that anticipate risks and invest in resilience before crises hit. 

“Countries that seize the incredible opportunities the clean energy transition presents. 

“Countries that don’t just see the connections but act on them. 

“That is why the UK is placing climate and nature security at the heart of our national security and foreign policy decision-making.”

This is a realignment of security policy that is badly needed. It’s obviously not enough to say it, you have to do it. It’s not enough for one country to do it, there have to be more. But this is a welcome sign of the UK under a new government getting back to forefront of this discussion, where it was ten years ago, and moving the discussion (and hopefully the policy) forward.

Are ‘forever wars’ forever?

A new concept has emerged to haunt us – the forever war.

It’s just one aspect of the bleak global picture today: more armed conflicts than at any time since the second World War; higher military spending than at any time ever; a new nuclear arms race getting under way; ecological crisis on a scale never experienced before in human history.

And the further problem is the apparent incapacity of our international institutions to address these challenges properly, combined with the melange of ambition and dunder-headedness of key political leaders that actively make things worse. 

But is ‘forever war’ the right term?

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Democracy: foundation of peace, asset for security

Thirty-plus years of high-level scholarly research has shown that democracy enhances security and security likewise contributes to democracy. The research shows that democracies are vulnerable to a range of insidious challenges from hostile forces but they have inherent resources to resist these challenges. 

The thing is, those resources need to be mobilised to defend and deepen democracy. Otherwise we will sit and watch and moan as drip by drip, freedom by freedom, biased court case and bad law by biased court case and bad law, our democratic rights leak away.

If democracy ends, that’s how it will be – not with a bang but a whimper.

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The Gulf crisis and the limits of power

On February 28, President Trump broke off negotiations with Iran and, together with Israel, launched air and missile strikes on Iran. Trump never stated the objectives with crystal clarity but before too long it was clear the war was not going to meet them. Its impact nonetheless goes wide and deep. Countries with no role in the war are on the receiving end of price shocks, and food insecurity has risen sharply. The war has also dealt a severe blow to US prestige, its influence and power. Because of that, this is potentially a moment marking a decisive shift from one era to another, from US predominance to – well, whatever comes next because that is a long way short of being clear.

What is clear is that the war on Iran amounts, among other things, to a self-inflicted blow to US power.

I address that issue in an article for International Politics and Society, the online journal of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Germany. The article is available here in English and here in German.

War in the Gulf: provisional balance sheet, part 3

Historians seem to expend a lot of time and energy arguing back and forth over many years on the balance of gains and losses in a war. The arguments tend to be plagued by uncertainties over data and definitions from beginning to end. History takes its own time to unfold, so it may not be until some time after the event that the results really start to become clear. Identifying a winner means defining what winning means. But the victor in the war may pay such a high price that they follow up by losing the ensuing peace. Not for nothing has the term Pyrrhic victory entered the lexicon, meaning a victory achieved at excessive cost – winning the battle but losing the war. It happens all too often and is one of many reasons why war should not be taken lightly. 

With such reservations in mind, this post is the third in a series aiming at an initial assessment of gains and losses in the Gulf war, looking at governments that were involved yet wholly or largely non-combatant.

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War in the Gulf: provisional balance sheet, part 2

The question is whether any government has benefitted from the Gulf War that began on 28 February when Israel and the USA attacked Iran. How do the costs and benefits stack up politically? Whose national interests have been enhanced by the war so far?

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War in the Gulf: a provisional balance sheet

In the space between peace and war that the Gulf crisis has now entered, and from which it may exit at any point, if only for a brief time, maybe this is a convenient moment to think about what has been gained and what has been lost so far. 

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War in the Gulf: Is it over? What’s the result?

There are reports in several outlets that Iran and the US are getting close to agreement on a memorandum to end the war. The reports are based, so it’s said, on leaks from the Pakistani team that is mediating the Iran-US discussions. So what we are seeing might be an effort by the mediators to move things along a bit. Or it may be a trial balloon at the request of one side or both to gauge reaction not only from the adversary but also, and more importantly, from their respective home fronts. Or we could just be hearing weightless rumours.

Only time will tell. We have heard so much rubbish in the claims and counter-claims from both sides that a bit of caution is justified. But being cautious about doubting the reports as well as believing them, it makes sense to take a closer look.

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