ceasefire

The Gaza peace plan after 7 weeks: 3rd assessment

/ Dan Smith / 2 Comments

IT IS TWO MONTHS since the Gaza peace plan was announced (29 September). A few days later, Hamas gave its conditional acceptance of the deal (3 October). On 8 October, the negotiators agreed a ceasefire, which was formally approved by the Israeli cabinet the next day. Implementation started on Friday 10 October.

This post is my third on the peace plan. As in the first and second, my aim is to assess it as a plan. I am not asking whether it was right or wrong, fair or unfair, but would it work? So, seven weeks in and one month after my last assessment, how is it doing?

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The Gaza peace plan, 2 weeks in: continuing assessment

/ Dan Smith / 1 Comment

On 8 October, two years and one day after Hamas’s savage incursion into Israel that triggered Israel’s hyper-destructive onslaught on Gaza, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio passed a note to President Trump in the middle of a press conference, then whispered to him to say he could announce that a ceasefire had been agreed.

So began the implementation of the 20-point Gaza peace plan that Trump had announced at the White House on 29 September. Discussion followed between Israel, Hamas and other interested parties – the USA, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and doubtless many others via standard diplomatic channels. On 3 October, after Trump set a 5 October deadline for Hamas to accept the plan or suffer “all hell”, Hamas agreed to release the remaining hostages it had held for two years, including the bodies of the dead, and repeated what it had said before, that Gaza could be run by a technocratic administration as Trump’s peace plan envisaged. As multiple news outlets reported, this was a partial acceptance – a “yes but” rather than full-blown consent. While Trump threatened Hamas with “complete obliteration” if it refused to fit in with his plan, the Israeli bombardment of Gaza continued, and negotiators met in Sharm el-Shaikh, Egypt, to get the peace plan on the road.

Two weeks after Rubio whispered in his President’s ear, how is the plan doing? I gave my view of it before there was any action, aiming to assess it as a plan, in its own terms, asking not whether it was right or wrong, fair or unfair, but would it work? It is what you could call a negotiations perspective, a technical assessment. In the same vein, two weeks in, how does it look now?

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Evaluating President Trump’s Gaza peace plan

/ Dan Smith / 6 Comments

The fate of the peace plan for Gaza announced at the White House on Monday 29 September is not yet decided. Because Hamas accepted the hostage return part of the proposed deal, while seeking negotiation of other parts, US President Trump ordered Israel to stop bombing. It did not immediately do that though the Prime Minister’s office said it was preparing for “immediate implementation” of the first stage of the plan.

There has, of course, been considerable coverage of the plan in the news media. Some focusses on its prospects, including the impact of divisions within Hamas about it, along with the matter of whether Trump will impose a deadline for Hamas’ acceptance and how long it might be. There has been some coverage of gaps and uncertainties in the plan and plenty of advocates have been out there to disparage or support the plan. And there’s been quite some discussion about whether President Trump prevailed over Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in crafting the plan, or the other way round.

But, so far as I have seen, there has been little dispassionate coverage of whether it is actually a good plan, whether it will work. So this post is my clause-by-clause assessment of the Gaza peace plan.

Peace is a tricky business. An 1100 word document containing 20 points is not a treaty, is not legally binding, and is bound to contain a number of generalities and broad statements of intent. That leaves plenty of room for uncertainty to creep in. Nonetheless, it is a serious document and not the first one to address how to end the war in Gaza. It builds on the never-implemented January 2025 agreement, which itself built on the never-implemented May 2024 agreement. With those foundations, there ought to be some key issues on which there is clarity but there should also be some latitude for uncertainty, interpretation and further discussion.

In sum, not surprisingly, what comes out is mixed – some strengths, some weakness, some areas of clarity and some confusion.

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Ukraine, 1 year on: China’s peace plan is not a plan

/ Dan Smith / 1 Comment

A year after the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine, China has come forward with a 12-point statement of its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. That, at least, is what is called by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It is widely reported in the international news media as a peace plan. See, among others, AlJazeera, AP, BBC, CNN, DW, Guardian, New York Times, Reuters, Sky, Time (though it calls it a proposal).

But it is not a plan and China does not say it’s a plan – it’s a position according to the government and to CGTN, Beijing’s state-run English-language news channel (though, to be fair, CGTN joined the crowd and called it a plan on the second day of coverage). Further, it does not outline either what a peace settlement could consist of or a pathway for getting there. It is a statement of opinion that stays away from specifics about what its support for dialogue and negotiation could mean in practice.

And I think that in ramping up a statement of position into a peace plan that can then be criticised for lacking specifics, the news media are missing something.

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