The ceasefire in the US-Israeli war on Iran brings cautious relief. The bombing, the missiles, the destruction and the killing can stop, which is unreservedly good. But ceasefires are tricky things. They reflect the dynamics of war as much as peace and the threats each side holds over the other persist. Israel and the USA can unleash physically destructive forces Iran cannot match. Iran can unleash economically destructive forces to which the USA has no viable response except more destruction.

That Iran’s strategy is viable is clear every time Trump blinks when the oil price jumps or the stock market slumps. And that strategy has given Iran the strategic initiative, which Trump’s threat to erase Iranian civilisation does not take away. 

Big blustery threats and swear words from Trump aside, what can we see unfolding amid the thick fog of this war? This is the second in a series of blog posts sketching out a few pointers I see to what is happening today and what may happen tomorrow and the day after. 

Ceasefire and no regime change

The ceasefire confirms what was already obvious, that regime change is off the table as a strategic military objective. Leaving aside nonsensical statements by Trump and Hegseth, there has been no regime change in Iran. A change in leadership, yes, and potentially a change in some aspects of its behaviour, but it’s the same regime with which the USA is now negotiating.

My impression is that Netanyahu and the government of Israel understand that, which is why Netanyahu took a few hours to endorse the 2-week break in the fighting and insisted the deal does not apply to Lebanon. With this he rejected what Prime Minister Shebaz Sharif of Pakistan, who led the mediation effort, confirmed was part of the deal. 

There is still, of course, every possibility that the ceasefire will be breached or lead nowhere. Its brightest prospects appear to rest on the ability of the four mediating powers (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye as well as Pakistan) to paint it as the off-ramp, down which Trump can drive, hooting his horn for a success that few others will recognise. 

If the ceasefire  does lead to the off-ramp, key issues to watch out for will be what happens to the 440 kg of enriched uranium Iran still holds and to control of the Strait of Hormuz. Under the ceasefire, Iran retains control of the strait but will allow ships through. In the longer term, as part of its proposed 10-point peace deal, it wants to share control with Oman and charge a fee. That would actually be contrary to international law, which says that passage through straits should always be free. That doesn’t it mean it won’t happen, perhaps for a period, to fund reconstruction.

An arrangement that looked at all like that would make it pretty clear who has won. Unfortunately, that would mean returning to the instability and risk that characterised the region throughout 2025, having been interrupted by a war that will have achieved precisely nothing.

How happy is Vladimir Putin?

Trump and Netanyahu have bailed out Putin. Russia’s war in Ukraine, inhuman and illegal from the outset, has been teetering on the edge of an abysmal failure. Progress on the battlefield has slowed to less than a crawl, at inordinate human cost that has led to net loss in armed forces personnel numbers – deaths and serious injuries are outpacing recruitment for the first time. To sustain current Russian strategy, a more wide-reaching mobilisation will be needed. 

Finances are falling short, the budget deficit is growing, and the economy has been slowly weakening, through the combined impact of Ukrainian attacks on the energy export industry and western economic sanctions. This pressure does not affect the short-term battlefield but might have long-term significance.

And then along came Trump and Netanyahu. Their irresponsible and illegal attack on Iran inevitably and predictably raised the cost of oil. Not only does that mean Russia earns more hard currency, which it badly needs, through its “shadow fleet” trade, but Trump has also eased the sanctions on Russian exports – a double whammy of a win.  And there are reports that the USA has been trying to pressure Ukraine’s government into relenting in its attacks on Russia’s oil industry so the price won’t rise too high. 

However, the relief Putin is gaining from this is relatively modest, partly because the scale of Russia’s self-imposed problems is so great, and partly because of the effectiveness of Ukraine’s attacks on the energy industry. Investment capital from the Gulf is also likely to shrink further because those potential investors now have other concerns. And Putin’s close support for the Iranian leadership – inevitable given how  they have aided him over Ukraine – means a diplomatic alienation from the Gulf, and even some distance from China, which has taken a more nuanced position over the war.

So Putin has reason to be less unhappy than he was for most of February but no reason to be genuinely upbeat. 

The war and world politics

Leaving aside the Trump bluster, the insults towards allies and their dignified responses, two key moments show how the war is affecting global relations. 

On 2 April, 40 states met to discuss how to keep the Strait of Hormuz functioning as an international trade route. The USA was not among them and, apart from those in the Gulf who are already involved, none of them want to be part of this war. The meeting ended without specific agreements but one thing comes quite clearly out of it: securing the trade route through the Strait, with or without a fee, is going to require some careful diplomacy. If that makes progress but is disrupted by Trump’s bluster from the sidelines or by renewed military action, another major wedge will have been driven in between the USA and its allies. Because that’s who met on 2 April.

Just before the 2 April meeting, President Zelensky of Ukraine was touring the Gulf – a two-day quick trip to Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. All three had asked for Ukrainian assistance in repelling Iran’s drones, which Russia has been using against Ukraine. Zelensky responded, visited and made deals. As he provides the practical support the Gulf states need to protect themselves from the consequences of American actions, we watch the USA losing influence in the region. 

The overall process – hesitant and uneven as it is – is that new coalitions and possibly new arrangements are being put together and they don’t rely on the USA. 

Something similar is happening in international trade. Trump’s tariff hikes have encouraged many governments to find other markets and suppliers. Fifteen new trade agreements have been arrived at that will not only diminish the ill effects of Trump’s tariffs but also, for these countries (among them, the EU, much of South America, Australia, Canada, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, the UK, others), reduce their trade dependence on the USA. 

When I wrote about the crisis in world order during 2024 and what to do about it, I focused primarily on the UN and related institutions and norms – the global dimension. But, as I wrote then, world order is about both constraints upon power and the exercise of power. The USA, having done so much of the heavy lifting to generate world order, exercised power within it over the years and benefitted in many ways, including from its ability as leader to bend the rules when it wanted to. What is happening now, as allies develop arrangements that don’t depend on the USA, is a shift in power relations within a changing in world order.

That is why, while President Xi of China has got the USA he always wanted – a diminished one – he may also have got the one he might fear – one that is no longer interested in world order but actually prefers volatility.

If and when Trump wakes up to the damage he is doing to US interests by undermining world order, what will be his administration’s reaction? Perhaps more to the point, will he wake up to it or is that a task for someone else?